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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STAT'E OF UTAH 
H. L. ALLRED, DEVON J. l\1cKEE, 
ORIN (HANK) SWAIN, JOSEPH 
WILCKEN, and ORLAN COOK, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
UNION SEED COMPANY and 
WAYNE MALIN, 
Defendants, 
UNION SEED COMPANY, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 8867 
I 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by alfalfa seed growers to recover 
money damages for the value of certain seed. The Union 
Seed Company of Burley, Idaho received the seed in 
question from Wayne :Malin, who operated as its special 
purchasing agent in Roosevelt, Utah. Union Seed Com-
pany paid :Malin for the seed, but Malin failed to pay the 
growers. The trial court entered judgment against both 
l\1alin and Union Seed Company for the value of all seed 
that had been so transferred and for which full pay-
ment had not been made. From this judgment Union Seed 
Company has appealed. 
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STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION 
The theory and facts upon which the trial court 
bottomed its findings, conclusions and decree cannot be 
set forth with clarity if we confine our brief to a point 
by point response to appellant's brief. We will, therefore, 
devote the first part of this brief to an analysis of the 
case as it really is and as we think the trial court saw it. 
To the extent consistent with sound organization, we shall 
respond to appellant's brief in the first section of our 
brief. To the extent that this is impracticable, we shall 
respond to the remaining portions of appellant's brief 
in the final section of our brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
\Ye agree with appellant to the effect that the facts 
of this case are not in dispute, and, in essence, we agree 
with appellant's Statement of Facts. There are, however, 
several important facts which we wish to add and empha-
size for the purpose of clarifying the nature of the alfalfa 
seed transactions which are the subject of this suit. 
The transactions were understood and approved by 
appellant and are of considerable significance in deter-
mining the scope of authority of appellant's agent. \Ye 
will, therefore, giYe a rather con1plete statement of facts 
at this time to avoid repeating the facts under each 
point of argument. 
Prior to 1950 'Yayne :1\[alin owned and operated a 
rPtail outlet for fanners· supplies in Roosevelt, rtah, 
( R. :~:>). 11 (\ owned a warehouse and sold various supplies 
to 1nost of the local far1ners, including the respondents, 
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(R. 35). In 1950 a Mr. Barnes and a Mr. Taylor from 
appellant Union Seed Company in Burley, Idaho con-
tacted Mr. Malin and asked him if he would serve as a 
special agent for appellant for the purpose of purchasing 
alfalfa seed, (R. 6). Mr. Malin said that he would, and 
appellant Union Seed Company procured the necessary 
license from the State Department of Agriculture for 
Mr. Malin to so serve, (R. 31, Plaintiff's Exhibits A, D 
& E). Mr. Malin was not licensed to purchase seed for 
other third parties, but only to serve as agent for appel-
lant. The alfalfa seed growers in the Roosevelt area were 
informed as to the nature of this arrangement, and, when 
negotiating to buy their seed, Mr. Malin told them that 
he was buying for Union Seed Company, (R. 24). 
Appellant furnished to Malin a seed cleaning ma-
chine, known as a clipper, which was used to clean the 
seed which the growers brought into his warehouse, (R. 
25). Appellant also supplied Malin with bags, and Malin 
in turn furnished these bags to the growers so that they 
could bag their seed and bring it into his warehouse, 
(R. 70-72). Appellant charged Malin for the bags, credit-
ing him for all bags returned, but Malin did not charge 
the growers for the bags if they sold their seed to appel-
lant, (Finding of Fact No.4). When the growers brought 
their seed into his warehouse, Malin would tag it with a 
lot number and store it until he could run it through the 
clipper, take a sample, and forward the sample to appel-
lant where it was tested for purity and germination, (R. 
6). Appellant would return a grade which would indicate 
the per cent of purity of the particular sample of seed, 
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( R. 6, 33). Sometimes a purchase price offer was included 
with the grade and sometimes it wasn't, (R. 32-35). If 
not, Malin often called appellant by telephone to deter-
mine what price he was authorized to offer for a par-
ticular grade of alfalfa seed, (R. 3-±). The offering price 
was dependent upon the market and also on the grade of 
the sample, and better grades of seed would receive 
better prices than the lower grades, (R. 33-34, 48-49). 
The market for alfalfa seed notoriously varies much 
within any season, and ~Ialin had to keep in contact with 
appellant from day to day in order to know y,-hat price 
to offer for a particular grade of seed, (R. 34). The 
rnarket, because of this substantial fluctuation, often 
reached a point where it was virtually impossible to sell 
the seed, (R. -!:8). And at times w-hen the market was low, 
even though seed could be sold, many growers refused to 
sell because they preferred to w-ait until the market price 
hecarne rnore favorable, (R. 48-49). 
Because of the fact that the growers often needed 
mmH_·~- before their seed w-as harvested or before they 
werP willing to aeeept a particular rnarket price, and 
lH'cau~<' t ht•y nearly always sold their seed to appellant, 
th<'~· cu~tomaril~- accepted advance smns of rnoney from 
appPllant. ~rhen, when the growers sold their seed, they 
n·<·Pin'd the purchase price less the amount which they 
had n'<'Pin•d as adYanres. The evidence shows that more 
than half of the growers cust01narily accepted these ad-
v:nH'<'~ ( l~~xhihih• H, 1\::. L. N), and that it was not un-
<'OIIImon for growers to receive two or three such ad-
vall<'<':-; lwforP the seed was final!~- sold and settlement 
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made. It was customary for appellant to advance these 
sums of money while the seed was still ripening in the 
field, or after it was harvested but before it was taken 
to Malin's warehouse, or after it was delivered to the 
warehouse but before it had been cleaned, sampled or 
graded. Because of the extreme importance which these 
transactions have in this case, we will illustrate some typi-
cal examples below. 
Before citing these examples, however, it will be 
helpful to observe that the method instituted to pay 
for all seed purchased was by draft which Malin would 
draw upon appellant and make payable to the particular 
grower, (R. 7, 8). The local bank would not permit the 
growers to draw credit against these drafts until they 
had been accepted and honored by appellant in Burley, 
(R. 17-18). This usually took several days, (R. 17-18). 
Since most of the growers were desirous of receiving 
the money on the advance immediately, Malin began to 
pay them by his personal check. He would then make 
appellant's drafts payable to himself and deposit them 
in his private account to cover the personal checks which 
he had written in payment of seed which he had pur-
chased for appellant. This procedure was fully approved 
by Mr. Barnes, who was appellant's manager, (R. 18-19). 
Soon, however, Malin began to draw drafts payable to 
himself as a matter of his own personal financial con-
venience, and the growers often did not receive payment 
for their seed, (R. 19-21). Malin also sold to appellant 
seed which he had not been authorized by the growers to 
sell (keeping the money for himself), and even went so 
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far as to sell to appellant seed which the growers speci-
fically instructed him not to sell (keeping the money 
for himself), (R. 41). 
Even though Malin drew these drafts payable to 
himself, he was obligated to list on the draft the com-
modity purchased, the lot number, the number of bags 
purchased, the gross weight, the net weight, the purchase 
price per unit, the dollar amount of the purchase, and 
the amount of his commission, (Exhibits H, K, L, N). In 
this manner, appellant was informed as to the purpose 
and nature of each draft, even though such draft was 
drawn in Malin's name. 
The draft books are in evidence. There were three 
copies of each draft: A pink copy, which was given to the 
payee; a white copy, which was sent to appellant; and a 
blue copy, which was left in the draft book. There are 
four such books in evidence, covering a period from De-
cember 8, 1953 to March 6, 1956. Chronologically, they 
are Exhibits, H, N, L, and K. In citing the following 
transactions, we will simply refer to the exhibit and the 
draft number. For exmnple, N -2623 would refer to draft 
number 2623 in Exhibit N. 
In viewing these transactions, it is well to keep in 
1nind the fact that these drafts fully revealed to appellant 
11H' nature of the particular transaction. as it honored 
each draft. "\Ye \Yill now turn to illustrative instances of 
advmw<>8, part paynwnts. and purchases. 
1. Outri!lht Purchases: "\Ye use the term "outright 
purcha8r" to designate those purchases of seed upon 
which there had been no advance payment and for which 
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the full purchase price was paid at the time of the sale. 
There were many of these transactions. Sometimes the 
drafts were made payable to the grower (N-2633, N-2623), 
but more often they were made payable to Malin (N -2615, 
X-2617). 
2. Down Payment or Part Payment when Price and 
Weight are Determined: At times a purchase was made 
and a down payment or part payment would be made 
by appellant, and the balance would be paid at a later 
date. The usual reason for defer~ing full payment was 
because the exact weight could not be determined until 
all of the seed had been "clippered." Illustrative of this 
situation is the case of one J. E. Wilcken. On November 
11, 1954 (check is misdated 1953) Wilcken sold Lot No. 
1719, consisting of 135 bags and a gross weight of 18,780 
pounds, for a price of 39c per pound, and was given an 
"advance" of $4,000.00 which was drawn in the name of 
the grower, (N-2647). One week later, on November 19, 
1954, Wilcken was given a second "advance" of $2,500.00 
on the same lot of seed, but this draft was drawn in 
Malin's name, (L-2301). Still later, on November 21, 
1954, final settlement was made on this lot of seed and 
the balance of $792.64 was drawn in the name of Malin, 
(L-2308). In this case there is a discrepancy of only 81 
pounds, since the final settlement was in payment of 
18,699 pounds and the initial draft reported 18,780 
pounds. A similar transaction wherein appellant and 
grower agreed on a price for a specific lot of seed and a 
sale was consummated, but final settlement was not made 
until the exact number of pounds was determined, is that 
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of Forrest Hancock. He sold Lot No. 1103, consisting of 
238 bags, for 20.6c per pound on November 9, 1954. Han-
cock was on that day given a draft in his name in the 
amount of $2,500.00 as an "advance," (N-2642). The 
exact weight was determined two weeks later and Han-
cock received a second draft in his name in the amount 
of $3,796.17, which completed payment of the full pur-
<·hase price, (L-2310). (See also, N"-2623, X-2628, X-2629). 
The transactions discussed under this section are 
actually sales at the date of first payment, since a speci-
fic quantity of seed "~as sold for a specific price per 
pound. Sometimes the total weight ·was determined at 
the time of sale, but usually the seed had not been run 
through the clipper for cleaning and the final weight 
could not be ascertained until later. 
3. Adt·ances on Seed TVhich zcas Harcested but not 
8 old: This see1ns to be one of the most common arrange-
ments. "\Yhen a grower harvested a certain number of 
bags, advance su1ns were often paid on such seed before 
an:~ purchase price was accepted. Typical of this arrange-
Inent is the case of Joe Page. On Septe1nber :21, 195:1: 
1\falin drP\\~ a draft in his (:J[alin·s) nan1e as an advance 
on 50 hags of seed owned by Joe Page. (X-2602). )lore 
than four nwnths later, on Janmu:~ :26, 1955. a price was 
a<'<'<'Pi<'d and .:\lalin dn\w the balance in his name for 
payllH'nt of Pagt\ ·s st\Pd. (L-:23:29). Silnilarly. Hamblin 
wa~ giv<'n an :ulvmwt\ on October :21. 195± for 9:2 bags of 
~<·Pd (N-:2(i:!l), and 'nl$ paid purportedly the balance 
1nor<' thnn two nwnths later wht•n a purchase price was 
purported I:~ :wet\ph•d and weights deter1nined, (L-2324). 
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(See page 38 of this brief.) Sometimes the period 
between the advance and the sale and settlement would 
be as long as eight months, (N-2604, N-2601, L-2330). 
Sometimes the drafts would provide that the seed was 
"to be clippered before settlement is made" (K-2524, 
K-2533), or "to be sold as soon as clippered and grades 
received" (N-2609). Sometimes the bags of seed had been 
brought into the plant before the advances were made and 
sometimes they hadn't. It was common to write "not all 
in plant yet" (L-2348), or "bags to be brot in and clipper-
ed" (K-2543), or, simply, "bags in plant" (L-2343). Also, 
it was common to merely note on the draft that the ad-
vance payment was for an approxi1nate number of bags 
(L-2337, L-2340, N-2601, N-2603, N-2604, N-2621). And 
sometimes the draft merely reflected an estimated num-
ber of pounds of seed, (H-2441, H-2442, H-2443, N-2606, 
N-2614). 
It was also common for appellant to make several 
advances on the same lot of seed before a sale was finally 
consummated. Typical is the case of Lillie Wash and 
Boyce J obe, who on September 1 received an advance 
on an estimated amount of seed (H-2441, H-2442), re-
ceived a second advance more than three months later, 
November 10 (listing the Lot Number and gross) (N-
2646), and finally accepted a purchase price and sold on 
December 14 (L-2319). A similar case is that of Alma 
Wills, explained by drafts N -2635, L-2317, L-2318. Some-
times Malin.would draw a draft to himself indicating that 
it was in payment of second and third advances on seed 
for which no purchase price had been accepted, (L-2311). 
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4. Advances on Seed which was not Harvested: The 
drafts reveal that appellant often advanced money to 
growers for seed which was still ripening in the field 
and which had not been harvested. These payments were 
often made as early as September, and would designate 
a number of acres upon which the advance was being 
made, as "20 acres" (L-2341), or "25 acres" (L-2339), 
or "35 acres" (L-2338, L-2342). The settlement would 
be made when the seed was harvested and sold. 
5. Drafts Without Explanation or for Advance 
Commission: The facts suggest that appellant accepted 
and honored :M.:alin's drafts without inquiry. On August 
11, 1955 ~Ialin drew to himself a draft in the sum of 
$1,499.64 with no explanation at all (L-2332). On Janu-
ary 11, 1954, ~Ialin drew a draft to himself in the amount 
of $800.00 as a "commission advance" (H-2430). Simi-
larly, on :\larch 1, 1954, Malin drew to himself a draft 
in the amount of $700.00 as "advance on commission" 
(I I -:2-l:W). There \Yas no other explanation on these 
drafts. Yet, they were forthwith paid b~- appellant. 
\Ye haYP listed several different types of trans-
act ion~ which ~lalin, as appellant's agent, entered into 
with the seed growers. Appellant was fully aware of 
t II<>~<' t ran~adion~ ~ince it received a copy of the yery 
draft~ whieh we haYe cited to show the type of trans-
:wt ion~ ,dtich took place. ~-\.ppellant neYer refused to 
lllak<' paynH'nt on an~- of these drafts, but expressly ap-
1) rovPd these pay1nent procedures without ascertaining 
"·hat adnal disposition Malin was making with the n1oney 
drawn in his nanw. (R. 19). 
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The respondents in this suit represent two groups 
of the seed growers. One group of respondents rejected 
the initial purchase offer tendered by appellant and 
instructed Malin to hold their seed until the market price 
was acceptable to them. Malin, contrary to these instruc-
tjons, sold their seed to appellant, received payment 
therefor by draft drawn in his own name, and appropri-
ated the money to his own use, (R. 41). 
The second group of respondents delivered their 
seed to Malin and had neither accepted nor rejected any 
of appellant's offers to purchase. Malin sold their seed· 
to appellant, received payment therefor by drafts drawn 
in his name, and appropriated the money to his own use. 
When they inquired as to the status of their seed, they 
were told it was in storage in Malin's plant, being clean-
ed, or held in storage at appellant's plant in Burley, 
(R. 29). 
Both groups of respondents were awarded judgment 
against Appellant and Malin for the full value of their 
seed less any advances which had been made to them. 
The Union Seed Company has appealed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO. 1 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING APPELLANT 
LIABLE FOR THE VALUE OF SEED WHICH RESPOND-
ENTS HAD REFUSED TO SELL. 
POINT NO.2 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING APPELLANT 
LIABLE FOR THE VALUE OF SEED WHICH IT RECEIVED, 
AND FOR WHI.CH RESPONDENTS WERE NOT FULLY 
PAID. 
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POINT NO.3 
DIRECT RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING APPELLANT 
LIABLE FOR THE VALUE OF SEED WHICH RESPOND-
ENTS HAD REFUSED TO SELL. 
Under this point we will discuss only those respond-
ents who specifically instructed :Jialin not to sell their 
seed. They took their seed to :Jialin's seed storage plant 
where it was to be cleaned, sampled and stored until such 
time as it was sold to a purchaser, presumably appellant. 
Respondents knew and understood that :Jialin was li-
censed only as the agent for appellant, and they normally 
sold their seed to appellant after it had been cleaned and 
sampled, and after they had been offered a price which 
was acceptable to the1n. Respondents knew that the alf-
alfa ~eed 1narket fluctuated every year and that the 
san1e buyer offered yarying prices at different times for 
the same qualit~~ of seed. These respondents did not ac-
<'Ppt the price initially offered by appellant, and they in-
~trueted .Jlalin to continue to hold their seed until such 
tilll<' as they were offered a price satisfactory to them. 
U11 kllo\\·n to these n•spondents. :Jialin sold and dis-
JH>~Pd of their seed in a n1anner cmupletely adverse to 
tiiPir ownt>rship rights. Tlris wrongful appropriation 
of rP~pmHlPnts• sel'd eonstituted a conversion. ~\.ppellant, 
a~ w<>ll as i\lalin, is liable for the full Yalue of all seed 
whi<'h it n'<'PiY<_'d as a result of :J[alin·s wrongful appro-
priation. Appellant was apparently unaware of the fact 
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that this seed had been converted by its agent Malin, but 
that fact is of no consequence with regard to appellant's 
liabilty for conversion. Professor Prosser, in stating 
one of the most elemental rules of conversion, declares: 
"The intent required is not necessarily a 
matter of conscious wrongdoing. It is rather an 
intent to exercise a dominion or control over the 
goods which is in fact inconsistent with the plain-
tiff's rights. A purchaser of stolen goods or an 
auctioneer who sells them in the utmost good faith 
becomes a converter, since his acts are an inter-
ference with the control of the property. A mis-
take of law or fact is no defense. 'Persons deal 
with the property in chattels or exercise acts of 
ownership over them at their peril,' and must take 
the risk that there is no lawful justification for 
their acts. The essential problem is whether the 
interference is of so serious a character as to re-
quire the defendant to buy the goods." 
* * * 
"Upon much the same basis, a bona fide pur-
chaser of the goods from one who has no power 
to transfer them becomes a converter when he 
takes possession to complete the transaction." 
PROSSER, TORTS §15 (1941). 
The Idaho case of Federal Land Bank v. McCloud, 
52 Idaho 694, 20 P.2d 201 summarizes the rule in a simi-
lar manner: 
"One who buys property must, at his peril, 
ascertain the ownership ; and if he buys of one 
having no authority .to sell, his taking possession 
in denial of the owner's right is a conversion." 
It is unnecessary to dwell at greater length upon 
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this rule of law, since it is one of the most fundamental 
in the entire field of torts, and is universally recognized. 
Appellant contends that there was no conversion be-
cause title to the seed in question passed to appellant. 
It is difficult to see how this could be. The Sales .Act, 
cited by appellant, could hardly be more express: 
"Where there is a contract to sell specific 
or ascertained goods, the property in them is 
transferred to the buyer at such time as the par-
ties to the contract intend it to be transferred.'' 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 60-2-2 (1953). 
When there is a contract to sell, the intent of the parties 
is controlling with regard to passage of title. In the 
instant fact situation there was not even a contract to sell. 
The offer had been rejected. Appellant's agent had been 
instructed by respondents to retain the seed and not to 
sell it until the market was more favorable. There intent 
could not be more clear. It is suggested, on page 21 of 
appellant's brief. that appellant could acquire title under 
the theory that l\Ialin was agent of respondents and that 
he had possession of the seed with indicia of ownership. 
But this rule of law is wholly inapplicable because :Malin 
was and continued to ren1ain appellant's purchasing 
ag-Pnt; appellant knew that Malin was not buying seed 
in his oVtrn natne for resale to appellant: and each draft 
drawn h~· l\falin revealed to appellant the fact that Malin 
wa~ hu~·ing for appellant. Each draft usually showed 
tlt<' growt>r and included a conunission to :Jialin . .Appel-
lant also knPw that l\falin "·as a bailee of the seed which 
wa~ in hi~ possl'ssion. The fads can in no way be twisted 
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to apply the rule of law for which appellant contends. 
Title did not pass. Appellant received seed wrongfully 
appropriated by 11alin, and, however innocent, is liable 
to these respondents for the full value of such seed. 
Appellant further argues that the decision not to sell 
on the part of these respondents amounted to collusion 
(page 21 of appellant's brief) and conspiracy (page 24 
of appellant's brief). Such contentions are wholly un-
tenable. These respondents who refused to sell their seed 
simply decided to wait for what they thought would be 
a more favorable market. They honestly declared their 
intentions, and such conduct was customary, appropriate, 
and completely familiar to appellant. The probability 
was that they would subsequently sell their seed to ap-
pellant, but they were not bound to do so, and if they sold 
to someone else they were charged a certain amount for 
appellant's bags which they used to bag their seed, as 
well as a storage fee. If we were to accept the view of 
appellant, i.e., that one is guilty of collusion and conspir-
acy if he refuses to accept an initial purchase offer, then 
respondents would have been faced with the choice of 
either accepting the initial offer, however unfavorable, 
or of being guilty of conspiracy and collusion. This would 
be absurd. Appellant's contention is completely without 
merit and there is nothing to indicate that the activities 
of these respondents was anything but customary and 
honest. 
A third contention of appellant is that these re-
spondents are estopped from asserting their claim, or 
that they have waived such right, because a period of 
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more than a year passed from the wrongful appropria-
tion to the filing of the complaint, and during such inter-
val they did not complain directly to appellant. Once 
again, this contention is without merit. These respond-
ents had no duty to inquire concerning the status of their 
seed, because they directed Malin not to sell their seed 
and thus understood that it was being held until they 
were willing to sell, and they had no indication that any-
thing had happened to their seed which was contrary 
to their instructions. Further, it is difficult to under-
stand the significance of appellant's argument, for the 
tort of conversion was complete at the moment appellant 
received possession of the wrongfully appropriated seed. 
Hespondents' cause of action was then created. These 
respondents could have rightfully waited the full period 
of the statute of limitations from the time they knew or 
reasonably should have known of the conversion, if they 
had so desired, without waiving any rights or being es-
topped. 
In ~mmlutn-, then, it seems abundantly clear that 
t l1 is group of respondents left their seed in the possession 
nf ~I alin for the purpose of cleaning, sampling, and stor-
in(r until such tiine as a price was offered which was 
/""'> 
:u·<·Pptahle to then1. ..:\ppt.•llant's initial offering price 
"·a~ unae<'Ppta hlP, and they instructed :JJalin not to sell, 
lmt to hold the seed until such tiine as the Inarket offered 
a ~ati~l'a<'tor~- pri<'t.>. Contr:.u·~- to these instructions, 
~I alin "-rongl~- appropriated the seed by selling it to 
appPllanL Despite appellant's seeming good faith, the~w 
faet~ elearly constitute a conversion. 
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POINT NO.2 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING APPELLANT 
LIABLE FOR THE VALUE OF SEED WHICH IT RECEIVED, 
AND FOR WI-UCH RESPONDENTS vVERE NOT FULLY 
PAID. 
Under this point we will discuss those respondents 
who delivered their alfalfa seed to Malin's plant for 
storage, cleaning, sampling, and grading, while negotiat-
ing for a purchase price. l\Iany of these respondents 
received advances on the seed which they expected sub-
sequently to sell, but the record is silent as to whether 
any of them ever accepted a purchase price and consum-
mated a sale. If they did not sell there is a conversion. 
If they did, they are entitled to be paid the balance due. 
Appellant takes the position that the trial court 
based the entire judgment upon the theory of conversion. 
This is not so. The trial court found that appellant had 
received certain seed for which respondents had not been 
fully paid (Findings of Fact Nos. 10 & 12). The court 
then simply determined that appellant was liable to re-
spondents for all seed so received, (Conclusion of Law 
No. 1, Decree No. 1). The court further determined that 
defendant Malin converted the seed of those respondents 
who had instructed him not to sell, and also converted 
the money of those respondents who had not refused to 
sell but who had not been fully paid, (Conclusion of Law 
No. 3, Decree No. 3). The fact that Malin's liability to 
both groups of respondents rests upon the theory of 
conversion does not necessarily mean that appellant's 
entire liability is based upon the same theory. Appellant 
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is liable under a tort action for conversion to those re-
spondents who refused to sell their seed, (as we discussed 
under Point I), but, as to those respondents who had no1 
expressly refused to sell their seed, and who were not 
fully paid, appellant is liable either under a tort action 
for conversion (if the sale were without authority), or a 
contract action for the purchase price (if :M:alin had 
growers implied consent to sell). 
Since there is absolutely nothing in the evidence, 
findings, conclusions, or decree to indicate that these 
respondents accepted a purchase price or that title to 
their seed passed to appellant, we submit that appellant's 
contention that title did pass is wholly unfounded. In 
fact, the fair purport of the evidence would seem to indi-
cate that respondents did not sell their seed. An indica-
tion of this is found in the following testimony of Mr. 
~lalin. 
"A. :Jiany of then1 had their seed stored in my 
place in Roosevelt. 
Q. But uwst of them knew you had shipped the 
seed out to Union Seed Company in Burley~ 
A. That would be in '35 and '56- '55. 
Q. You 1nean that the~- did lmow that in 1955, 
that it was being shipped! 
A. Generally, yes. 
Q. \riH'n thP)- didn't n=-C'PiYe payment and asked 
vou about it. You told then1 it was still being 
held in storag~ up in Burley? 
A. l~~itiH'r that or I had it in 1ny own place or it 
\ras ht>ing cleaned. I Inean, it was a general 
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conversation. I don't remember of anything 
definite, the wordings and so forth. 
Q. You didn't tell them in any instance that you 
had received payment from Union Seed Com-
pany and not turned it over to them~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. You concealed that fact from them until after 
the 1956 deliveries~ 
A. Right. 
Q. By giving them one excuse or another as to 
where their seed was~ 
A. Right." (R. 29) 
Just prior to this testimony quoted, Mr. Malin had 
been speaking about the respondents who had instructed 
him not to sell their seed. But then he began a general 
discussion of those growers who inquired concerning 
the whereabouts of their seed and payment for their seed. 
The testimony just quoted refers to respondents gener-
ally. From the nature of the excuses given by Mr. Malin, 
it seems that the respondents who inquired were essen-
tially interested in the whereabouts of their seed rather 
than in receiving the balance of any purchase price. If 
respondents had sold their seed and were entitled to a 
balance of their purchase price, then it certainly seems 
that they would have requested the remainder of their 
money rather than information concerning the location 
of the seed. 
As a further indication that title did not pass, there 
is evidence that this group of respondents merely re-
ceived advances on their seed and never accepted a pur-
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chase price. When their seed was "sold" by Malin, he 
simply kept their money and did not inform them of what 
he had done. \V e could cite specific cases of several re-
spondents, but we will confine our examples to Huber 
and Hamblin. Appellant, on page 17 of its brief, selects 
Huber and Hamblin as two respondents who allegedly 
demonstrate the general complacency of respondents in 
not demanding the balance of the purchase price which 
was payable to them. The facts with regard to these two 
growers conclusively show, ho·wever, that they had merely 
received advances; that they had not accepted a purchase 
price or sold their seed; and that title to their seed did 
not pass. \Y e have discussed the cases of Huber and 
llamblin in detail on pages 38-40 of this brief in response 
to appellant's argument on waiver and estoppel. \Ye have 
1nade reference at this time to these two respondents 
becau~e the transactions concerning them demonstrate 
not only that their clai1ns are not barred by estoppel or 
waiYPI'. but also that title to their seed did not pass to 
appellant. 
There i ~. therefore, strong evidence to show that 
mo~t of the respondents did not sell their seed. The rec-
ord. lln\n'Y<'I'. does not conclusively show that none of the 
r<>~pondenb sold their sPed. But, assuming arguendo 
t lw t none of respondents sold their seed, ~Ir. ~Ialin w·ould 
haY<' \\Tongfull~· appropriated and transferred to appel-
lant ~('t>d t n which he had neither title nor authority to 
~<' 11. A p p<' II ant would then be liable as a converter to all 
r<>~tHmdPnt~ for thP reasons set forth in our Point Ko.l. 
A~~uming. on the other hand, that son1e of these 
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respondents actually did sell their seed and title passed 
to appellant as appellant contends, we will move now to a 
consideration of appellant's liability for the purchase 
price. The evidence indisputably shows that appellant 
understood and approved procedures whereby Mr. Malin 
made purchases, down payments, part payments, and 
advances on seed which had not yet been purchased and, 
indeed, -in many cases on seed that had not even been 
harvested. We have fully illustrated these practices and 
procedures in our Statement of Facts. It cannot be shown 
that Mr. Malin entered into any transaction which was 
contrary to instructions or authority which he had been 
given by appellant, except for the actual conversions in 
question. We think that this is a clear case of express 
authority wherein the agent acts in the very kind of 
transaction which the principal has approved, and, in so 
acting, wrongfully converts to himself the money which 
he received from the principal. 
Since we are now assuming that title to the seed in 
question passed to appellant, and since it has been shown 
that any sales so consummated would have been with 
the approval of appellant, we will briefly set forth the 
law on acts of agents which are expressly authorized h)' 
the principal. 
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 3, § 231 (at page 
142) we read: 
"A principal is liable for the acts of his agent 
within his express authority, because the act of 
such agent is the act of the principal. Where the 
agent acts within the scope of the authority which 
the principal holds him out as possessing, or 
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knowingly permits him to assume, the principal 
is made responsible, because to permit him to dis-
pute the authority of the agent in such a case 
would be to enable him to commit a fraud upon 
innocent third parties. (Citing cases.) 
Continuing in Section 233 (page 144): 
"Where an agent acts on behalf of a disclosed 
principal, and commits acts in the principal's 
name, such acts and contracts, within the scope 
of the agent's authority, are generally considered 
as the acts and contracts of the principal and are 
binding upon him, ... (citing cases)." 
Continuing in Section 241 (page 163) : 
". . . a principal is liable to third persons 
on all contracts made for him by his agent while 
acting in the course of his employment and within 
the scope of his authority, ... (citing cases)." 
Malin, as appellant's agent, had express authority 
from appellant to enter into every transaction which is 
the subject matter of this suit. The mere fact that :.\Ir. 
Malin was enabled by his position to wrongfully appro-
priate money and seed in no wa~- excuses appellant from 
liability. 
In order to show that ~falin acted beyond the scope 
of his authority. appellant cites cases to the effect that 
an agent cannot bind his principal b~- purchasing on 
credit if he is given the cash to 1nake full pa~J.nent and 
i:-; instructed not to buy on credit. "\Ye do not take ex-
<'Pption to thi~ rule of law as an abstraet principle, 
but W<' think it has little application to the case at bar. 
Ji~V<'r~·mH' - appellant, :.\lalin, and respondents - Imew 
that the :-;alP~ were made directly to appellant and that 
l\l alin did not have authority to purchase in his own 
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name. Everyone concerned intended that, when a sale 
was made, title would pass immediately and directly 
to appellant. :Malin was not given the cash to make 
payment for the seed which he purchased for appellant. 
He was given drafts which he could draw against ap-
pellant, but these drafts had to be subsequently accepted 
and honored by appellant. For this reason the local banks 
1vould not permit the growers to draw credit against 
these drafts until they had been so accepted and honored, 
which usually took several days. If appellant considers 
this procedure to be credit purchases, then appellant had 
fully authorized such purchases and all of the cases 
cited by appellant wherein the agent had no authority 
to make credit purchases is irrelevant. 
Appellant also clearly approved the practice adopted 
by its agent ~falin whereby he would make an advance 
payment on seed which was not harvested; or which, 
if harvested, had not yet been purchased but which 
appellant hoped to buy; or part payment on seed which 
appellant bought. Appellant also expressly approved 
~falin's practice of drawing to himself drafts in pay-
ment of these various transactions. If appellant con-
siders these transactions to be credit purchases, then 
appellant has still fully authorized such purchases and 
the authority cited wherein the agent had no authority 
to make credit purchases is irrelevant. 
If on the other hand, appellant does not consider 
the above arrangements or the transactions outlined 
in the Statement of Facts to be credit purchases, then 
we are unable to see where there was any credit pur-
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chases in the instant fact situation. There is no evidence 
indicating that Malin ever made any payment that was 
not fully and knowingly approved by appellant. Now here 
is there any indication that anyone thought that respond-
ents were selling their seed directly to Malin. Appellant 
never intended to buy from any one but the grower. 
Malin did not even purport to buy for his own account, 
either on credit or for cash. X early every draft shows 
Malin drawing a commission from appellant. Whatever 
arrangements he made, he made for appellant. Again, 
we repeat that there is absolutely no evidence of any 
credit sales other than those arrangements which were 
fully understood, authorized and approved by appellant. 
The problem is simply that ::Malin, as appellant's agent 
to purchase seed, failed to make full payment to the 
growers for the seed which he shipped to appellant. 
~..,urther, Malin was able to accomplish this wrongful 
conduct by the very procedure which appellant had ap-
proved. The issue, therefore, is not at all concerned with 
credit sales which a principal has instructed his agent 
not to consum1nate because the principal supplies his 
agent with ample cash. The real issue. rather, is the 
question of who shall suffer when one of two innocent 
parties must suffer from the wrongful acts of a third 
:H·r~on. Appellant, though careless in not ascertaining 
the disposition which its agent was 1naking with the 
monp~· drawn in his naine, was in good faitl1 and, for 
purpose~ of this argun1ent, will be considered an inno-
<'<'nt party. 
App<•llant does eit<' one case which bears upon tlris 
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issue. It involves a situation wherein the principal clothed 
the agent with apparent authority and was thus held 
liable for the loss. Since in the case at bar appellant 
had given Malin actual, rather than apparent, authority 
for the procedures he pursued, we submit that respond-
ents stand in an even stronger position than the innocent 
purchasers discussed hereafter. In the case cited by 
appellant, ~Harrison vs . .A~~to Securities Co., 70 Utah 11, 
257 Pac. 677 (1927), a state agency intrusted an auto-
mobile to a local agency for the purpose of exhibiting 
it and soliciting buyers of cars. The local agency acted 
contrary to instructions of its principal (the state 
agency) and sold the car to an innocent purchaser. 
This Court, in sustaining a judgment in favor of the 
innocent purchaser, said: 
"The trial court was of the op1n10n that it 
appears from this record that one of two inno-
cent parties must suffer from the wrongful act 
of a third person, and that the loss should fall 
upon the one who by his conduct created the 
circumstances which enabled the third party to 
perpetrate the wrong and cause the loss, and 
determined the case on that principle of law. The 
rights of the parties, in our judgment, could well 
be ruled upon this general principle of law, and, 
so ruled, would entitle plaintiff to recover." 
In applying this case to the instant facts, appellant 
argues that respondents were the parties who had created 
the circumstances which enabled the wrong because they 
failed to complain directly to appellant. Appellant's 
position seems to be that if such complaints had been 
made appellant would have discovered the wrongdoing 
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of its agent and prevented further misconduct. It is 
respectfully submitted that this interpretation by appel-
lant is a gross misapplication of the rule of law pro-
nounced by this case. 
The state agency had intrusted an automobile to a 
local agent for the purpose of exhibiting it, soliciting 
buyers and making sales. The state agency, thus pro-
moted by a desire for pecuniary profit, set in motion a 
situation which caused an innocent purchaser to buy 
a car which was to be for exhibition only. Both the state 
agency and the purchaser were innocent parties, but 
~l1e state agency had prompted and instituted the chain 
of events which led to the loss which ultimately had to 
be assessed against one of them. If things had gone as 
planned, the state agency is the one who would have 
1nade the profits and benefited from the situation which 
it created. The court deemed it only fair to make the 
state agency stand the loss, even though innocent be-
cause it had created the circun1stances which enabled 
the third party (local agency) to perpetrate the wrong 
and cause the loss. 
In the case at bar appellant lTnion Seed Company 
was prompted by a desire for pecuniary gain to appoint 
l\f alin a~ special agent to purchase alfalfa seed. Under 
this appointment, both Malin and appellant were to 
profit. It so happened, howeYer. that these circun1stances 
<'r<'at<~<l by appellant enabled l\Ialin to perpetrate a wrong 
which ean~ed a loss whirh 1nust be assessed against either 
appe11ant or respondents. Assu1ning that they are both 
innocent parties, it seems manifestly clear that appellant 
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is the one who must bear the loss for it is he who 
created the circumstances enabling the loss and it is he 
who stood to profit from the wheels which he set in 
motion. 
All one need do is examine the drafts to determine 
the freedom given to Malin by Appellant. Each draft, 
of course, had to be honored before it was paid, and 
at the time the draft was drawn, a white copy of it 
showing in detail what it was for was sent by Malin 
to Union Seed. The contention that Malin was dealing 
as agent for the grower or that he was buying for his 
own account and reselling to appellant is totally de-
stroyed by the drafts. Malin, in every instance, provided 
for a commission for himself. When he acted for 
appellant in the purchase of seed, he was entitled 
to a commission-on no other basis would the commission 
have been payable. The settlement drafts show in nearly 
tvery instance the name of the grower and a commission 
to Malin. As is noted in more detail in the statement of 
facts, he drew some drafts merely as advance commis-
sions to himself-not related to any transaction, and these 
were honored. In some instances he drew drafts with-
out making any notation at all as to what it was for. 
In others, he drew drafts showing merely that it was 
an advance on 35 acres of seed. On others he put the 
notation that the seed was to be brought in, etc. These 
drafts were being honored one by pne as they were 
presented. Appellant had actual knowledge of the method 
being pursued by Malin. The drafts were payable to 
himself and appellant elected to trust him. 
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The contention being here made by appellant, that 
~Ialin was provided with and instructed to pay cash, 
and that he had no authority to deal in any other fashion, 
simply is contrary to the record. Malin, in accordance 
with what is probably the uniform custom in buying 
alfalfa seed, made numerous types of deals. Because he 
was drawing drafts to cover each one, appellant knew, 
deal by deal, what he was doing. It is inconceivable 
that appellant could receive a draft reading, "advance 
for 35 acres of seed'' and think that title had passed, 
or the seed had been harvested, graded, sampled, etc. 
ln fact, appellant knew that this could not be, for under 
the procedure which always preceded the sale, the seed 
was given a lot number. It was cleaned and sampled. 
The samples were sent to appellant and graded and 
priced, and at this time M:alin knew the price he was 
authorized to pay. So when these first drafts came in 
for 35 acres of seed, without lot nmnber, sample, grade, 
or weight, even without any description of quantity, 
appellant knew positively that ~Ialin "-as Inaking an 
"~HlYanre." It could tell frmn the date and from the 
description of the seed as being so n1any acres that the 
seed was still gro•wing unharvested. 
The problen1 of purchasing agricultural produce 
frmn fanners and then not paying for it. has obviously 
bPPJl a continuing and 8Prious problen1. The Legislature, 
tiH'r<'l'orP, adopted Chapter 1. Title 5. r.C.A. 1953, to 
proiPet the fanner. ~Pet ion 3 recited in a declaration of 
policy: 
"~l 1 ltat it i8 recognized that the producer of 
fann pnHlnet8 * * * * is subject to unusual haz-
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ards and losses in his dealings with certain per-
sons who seek to obtain and do obtain from such 
producer his products for resale." 
As a result, the statute requires persons dealing 
with producers of farm products to be licensed. A 
person, representing a dealer, broker or commission 
merchant, is required to be licensed as an agent, as 
Malin was. Malin, under this statute had no authority 
to buy on his own behalf. He was the agent of appellant 
only, and had authority to buy on its behalf only and as 
its agent. He was held out to the public as having this 
capacity. Then, appellant, which had licensed him as its 
:xgent, permitted the making of deals of various types, 
and specifically knew that :Malin was making advances 
and expressly authorized him to do so. The advance could 
be made while the seed f\vas still growing in the field, 
or after it was harvested but before delivery to Malin, 
or after delivery to :Malin but before the purchase agree-
ment had been completed, etc. Drafts drawn against 
appellant for these advances were honored. Various 
services were rendered to the grower, obviously for 
the purpose of aiding the negotiation and ultimate pur-
chase of the seed. Appellant made bags available prior 
to any purchase agreement. The grower put his seed in 
the bags so furnished, and if the sale was to appellants, 
he didn't have to pay anything for the use of the bags. 
If he sold his seed somewhere else, he did have to buy 
the bags. Malin was storing the seed prior to the con-
summation of a deal. If a deal were finally closed, no 
storage fee was charged. If it was not, he charged for 
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storage. A machine twas furnished to clean the seed. 
This happened before the seed was graded, priced and 
bought, and the farmer was helped out financially by 
advances being made to him before the sale, and some-
times even before the harvest. These things were all 
calculated to morally bind the grower to sell to appel-
lant. Malin was obviously given considerable latitude by 
appellant, as is clearly evidenced by the various types 
of deals that he made, and in the end result appellant 
simply trusted Malin to the extent that he could draw 
drafts upon it payable to himself and in many in-
stances with very little or no descriptive information. 
He could get advance commissions for himself. He 
eventually drew some drafts without saying what they 
were for. He had worked ~th appellant over a period 
of years and it obviously trusted him, but more important 
to this case is that the deals he was making were with 
its knowledge, approval and consent, and it held him 
out as its agent to make the deals. 
One thing, and one thing only, went wrong. Malin 
turned dishonest. He started drawing drafts pay-able 
to himself, without paying the grower. \'l1en the growers 
inquired about their seed, he gave the1n excuses~ but 
basicall)· left the1n with the ilnpression that their seed 
•wa~ ~till on hand. One draft at least. payable to a 
1growPr, wa~ forged by :l\falin. It doesn't 1natter how the 
1 1roblein is approached - the seed was delivered to 
appellant'~ agent in accordance with the established cus-
1 om. The seed for whirh respondents have been given 
judgmPnt actua1ly was received by appellant and used 
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by it. Respondents have not been paid for their seed. 
True, appellant has advanced the money to its agent, 
~ialin, but he did not turn the money over to the grower 
who owned the seed, and the growers are entitled to 
payment. 
The law in other jursidictions is in near universal 
accord with the Utah position. When a principal appoints 
an agent for the conduct of certain business affairs 
which are designed to benefit the principal, the principal 
is estopped from denying the apparent authority of the 
agent and any loss occasioned by the agent's apparent 
authority will be assessed against the principal rather 
than against innocent parties dealing with the agent. 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 2, § 96 (page 1211) 
states the rule as follows: 
"The doctrine of apparent authority rests 
upon principles of estoppel, or in the nature of 
an estoppel, forbidding one to deny to the pre-
judice of those he has misled the consequences 
of an appearance of power which he produced. 
"The basi::.; upon which this rule is usually 
deemed to rest consists in the fact that apparent 
authority is regarded as being in the nature of 
authority by estoppel, the great preponderance 
of cases which consider this phase of the subject 
expressing the view, in substance, that the prin-
cipal, having clothed the agent with the semb-
lance of authority, by his conduct or inaction 
as the case may be, will not be permitted after 
others have been led to act in reliance on the 
appearances thus produced, to deny, to the pre-
judice of such others, what he has theretofore 
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tacitly affirmed as to the extent of the agent's 
powers. (citing cases). 
"Whether or not estoppel, in its technical 
sense, is regarded as underlying the rule, appar-
ent authority at any rate is nearly related thereto, 
implying a transaction itself invalid and a per-
son who is forbidden for equitable reasons to set 
up that invalidity; a principal may bind himself 
by causing others to believe the agent's authority 
to be greater than actually is the case. (citing 
cases) Ultimately it is but another application of 
the fundamental maxim that any loss from mis-
conduct of a third person should fall on that one 
of two imzucent perso;ls dealing through him who, 
by his co11j'idence, had made the loss possible. 
(citing cases) 
"To permit the principal to dispute the 
agent's authority in such a situation zrould be 
to allozc him to commit a fraud upon the rights 
of innocent persons.,•· (Citing cases) (emphasis 
added) 
The general law of agency applicable to the case 
at bar seen1s to be too clear to be disputable. The above 
quotations set forth the law with regard to the apparent 
authori t~- of an agent which pennits him to act to the 
prejudice to an innocent purchaser. \Yhen :Jialin con-
verted respondents' seed or n10ney. he exceeded his 
authorit~-. but sinee :Jfalin accmnplished this by ,-irtue 
of the YPhielP which appellant had giYen hun, appellant 
i~ liable to respondents. 
If appellant had t)XL\reised care and caution in these 
tran~adion~. and it' ~lalin'::' authority was only apparent 
(rather than Pxpress). it is sub1nitted that appellant 
would still be liabh) to respondents under the law just 
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quoted. It is repeated, however, that the instant case is 
one where the principal did not use due care in dealing 
·with his agent, and, further, that the agent had express, 
rather than apparent, authority. This reinforces the posi-
tion of respondents to a degree where it is difficult to 
see how appellant can escape liability. 
Under this point we have shown that appellant is 
liable to respondents whether or not title passed to 
appellant. If title passed, appellant is liable to respond-
ents for the purchase price; if title did not pass, appel-
lant is liable to respondents for conversion. 
POINT NO.3 
DIRECT RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
We shall now proceed to examine, point by point, 
the brief of appellant. To the extent that we have 
already responded to sections of appellant's brief, we 
will so indicate by reference to earlier sections of this 
brief. Though the wording of appellant's points of argu-
ment suggests that the trial court reached conclusions 
that it did not reach, we will, as a matter of simplicity 
and convenience, accept appellant's phraseology. 
(a) The Trial Court Did Not Err In Its lVfemor-
andum Opinion And Its Finding That Wayne 
lV.falin Converted Plaintiff's Seed And That 
F nion Seed Company Is Liable For The 
Value Of The Seed Because Of Conversion. 
We will make two observations with regard to this 
point of appellant's brief. First, appellant's liability 
for conversion does not rest merely upon the fact that 
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appellant's agent converted respondents' seed. Not at 
all! Appellant was held liable for only that seed which 
it received and appropriated to its own use in a manner 
contrary to the rights of the owners. This is to say that 
appellant is liable for its own conversion, rather than 
for the conversion of its agent. 
The second observation is with regard to passage 
of title. Point No. 1 of appellant's brief is devoted ex-
clusively to the contention that title to all of the seed 
in question passed to appellant and there thus could 
have been no conversion. \V e have shown under our 
Point No. 1 that title could not have passed with regard 
to those respondents who refused to sell their seed. 
Under our Point No. 2 we discussed those respondents 
who had not specifically refused to sell their seed, and 
demonstrated that, though there is persuasive evidence 
to show that title did not pass, the evidence does not 
conclusively reveal that title to none of the seed passed. 
\~r e there pointed out, however, that for the purpose of 
sustaining the trial court's judgment, it is really imma-
terial whether or not title passed. If it did not. appellant 
i~ liable as a ronYerter: if a sale was 1nade and title 
did pa~~, appellant is liable for the purchase price. 
(b) '1_1he Trial Court Did X ot Err In Finding 
That \YaYlH' l\falin Acted \Vithin The Scope 
Of I-Iis A.uthnrit~- .-\.~ A Special .. Agent \Yhen 
He l\fade Cn.'dit Purchases, .-\.nd In Finding 
That The Respondents Did X ot \VaiYe ~1.ny 
Claim Again~t Appellant B~- X ot De1nanding 
And Obtaining Payment In Full )tt Time Of 
Sale. 
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Appellant actually forwards two arguments under 
its Point No.2. These are (1) that Malin had no authority 
to make credit purchases and, in allegedly so doing, he 
acted beyond the scope of his authority, and (2) that re-
spondents waived their rights to full payment by not mak-
ing timely demands to appellant. Appellant's second 
argument on waiver is the same as its argument under 
Point No. 3 on estoppel, and in order to avoid undue 
repetition we will defer response to that argument until 
we discuss estoppel. 
With regard to Malin's scope of authority, we would 
like first to observe that an agent's scope of authority 
is relevant for the purpose of determining whether a 
principal shall be bound by the contracts of the agent. 
Appellant's liability for conversion does not rest upon 
the scope of authority of Malin, but upon appellant's 
appropriation to itself of the ownership rights in re-
spondents' seed. We make this distinction at this time 
to clarify the theories of liability and the authority cited 
to sustain these theories. Appellant takes the position 
J~hat the trial court based its judgment solely upon con-
version, and then appellant cites authority to show that 
it was error to hold appellant liable for the purchase 
price because the purchases were beyond the scope of 
the agent's authority. Needless to say, the citations of 
authority are not relevant to the legal proposition put 
forward. 
We have taken the position under our Point No. 2 
of this brief that, as to those respondents who had not 
refused to sell their seed, liability might be based upon 
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either conversion or purchase price. Nothing additional 
need be said with regard to that position, since we have 
already argued it rather fully. We would like to point 
out, however, that every citation of authority given by 
appellant on pages 10-15 of its brief deals with an agent 
who has been given cash by his principal and who has 
been instructed to make only full cash payments on 
purchase. Those citations of authority are not objection-
able to us, but they have no application to the fact 
situation before this court. Every mode and method of 
payment used by :Jialin was accepted and approved by 
appellant, as we have shown in our Statement of Facts. 
Malin was not at any time given cash to make purchases; 
he was limited to drawing drafts which had to be ac-
cepted and paid by appellant several days after purchase. 
Appellant's brief, on page 10, states: ''There is no 
evidence that the appellant ever authorized or knew of 
a credit purchase. There is no e\idence that appellant 
knew, or could have known, that the growers had not been 
paid in full." \Y e haYe shown. in our State1nent of Facts, 
that appellant approved various kinds of transactions, 
and had knowledge that son1e accounts went longer than 
eight months before final payn1ent was 1nade. ~-\ctuall~,, 
1nost of the initial pay1nents 1nade b)T appellant through 
J\1 alin wen' advances, and were not part payn1ents of the 
pn reha~P priee. \Yhile it is quite possible that some of 
these transactions were in the nature of credit sales. most 
of then1 W<'l'f' naked adYaiH'l'S and were in no ·way credit 
salt>~. And, as to those which 1night have been credit 
~al<'~. it i~ eh'ar that appellant approved such sales, as we 
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have shown by those transactions listed under "Down 
Payments or Part Payments" in the Statement of Facts. 
We summarize our response to appellant's argument 
on scope of authority in this manner: (1) Most of the 
transactions were simply advances on seed which appel-
lant later hoped to buy, and were not credit sales; and 
(2) as to those transactions which might have been credit 
sales, appellant had fully authorized such transactions. 
(c) The Trial Court Did Not Err In Finding That 
The Respondents Are Not Estopped From 
Asserting Their Claims Against Appellant. 
1. As To All Respondents 
As . we earlier indicated, we will discuss appel-
lant's arguments as to both waiver and estoppel at 
this time since both points are essentially the same. 
Perhaps the simplest response to this part of appellant's 
brief is to examine each illustration of fact and citation 
of authority. 
It is first contended, on top of page 16 of appel-
lant's brief, that respondents waived their rights to 
payment by not demanding full cash payment on delivery 
of their seed. To support the contention that there is 
a prima facie waiver of cash payment by not demanding 
the same on delivery, appellant cites Comer v. Cunning-
ham, 77 N.Y. 391, 33 Am. Rep. 626. Little need be said 
in response to this contention of appellant, since respond-
ents did not sell their seed when it was delivered. It 
was delivered for the purpose of cleaning, sampling, 
grading, and negotiating for a purchase price. To argue 
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that respondents have waived the right to claim pay-
ment because they did not demand full cash payment 
before their seed was weighed, cleaned, or sold, is to 
pursue an unmeritorious contention. 
In order to show that respondents were very negli-
gent in not demanding full payment shortly after the 
sale of their seed, appellant cites on page 17 of its 
brief the cases of Huber and Hamblin. We think that 
appellant has fairly cited two typical examples, but we 
think that appellant has not shown what actually hap-
pened in those cases. Appellant says that both Huber 
and Hamblin received payments on their seed prior to 
December of 1954, and that in that month the seed \\~as 
shipped and drafts in full payment were honored by 
appellant. It is then asserted that respondents Hamblin 
and Huber didn't tell appellant directly about not being 
fully paid until :\Iay of 1956. Let us see what really 
happened in these two cases. 
Hamblin was given a draft in his name in the 
amount of $1500 (not $1,700) on X ovember 21. 1954. 
(N-2621) This pay1nent was siinply an .. advance on Lot 
#1702-92 Bags.·· There was no ascertained weight and 
no purchase price was given. Tins was n1erely a naked 
advance and no sale was n1ade. Later, on X ovember 
:2:~, 1 Dr>-+, l\lalin drew a draft in his own na1ne for the 
smn of $rl.500 whieh included a second ad"nuwe in the 
mnount of $1,500 on Ha1nblin 's Lot #170~. (L-2311) 
lian1hlin IH'Yt>r ktww about this second advance. On De-
CPllliH'r :2:~, 1954 l\1 alin purportedly sold Han1blin's seed 
for $31.7["> per one hundred pounds, took a connnission 
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for the sale, deducted $3000 for the two $1500 advances 
previously made, and drew a draft in his own name 
for the balance of the purchase price, or $921.77. (L-2324) 
Hamblin never knew about this purported sale. So, all 
boiled down, the facts are simple. Hamblin was given 
a $1500 advance on November 21, 1954, and was then 
waiting to sell his seed. Malin drew a subsequent draft 
in the amount of $1500 and also sold Hamblin's seed 
without informing him. Appellant contends that Hamb-
lin should have complained about not receiving full 
payment on the sale of his seed, when Hamblin had no 
knowledge that his seed had been sold. When the re-
spondents did inquire as to the location of their seed 
(not the purchase price, since they didn't know of any 
sale), Malin gave them various explanations which they 
apparently believed (R. 29). It is difficult to see how 
Hamblin could have waived any right or be estopped 
from asserting any claim under these facts. 
The case of Huber, also cited by appellant, is essen-
tially the same as that of Hamblin and we will attempt 
to present it in a more abbreviated manner. Huber was 
given an advance on November 10, 1954, and Malin 
drew to himself a draft in the amount of $1400 (not 
$1300). (N-2646) This was simply an advance; no price 
was listed and no sale was made. On December 20, 1954 
Malin sold Huber's seed and drew to himself the balance 
of the purchase price. (L-2322) Huber did not know 
of this disposition of his seed, but assumed that it was 
still being held for sale. Once again, appellant charges 
Huber with carelessness in not complaining about the 
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balance of the purchase price on a sale which he did 
not know had been made. Rather than complacency on 
the part of Huber and Hamblin, the facts demonstrate 
a conversion on the part of Malin, and, also, a con-
version on the part of appellant. Such being the case, 
Huber and Hamblin joined with other respondents in 
bringing this action shortly after they discovered the 
conversion. 
Appellant's next citation is Cleveland '1:. Pearl, 63 
Vt. 127, 21 Atl. 261 (1891), wherein an agent had been 
given cash for payment but the seller accepted the 
agent's personal check as part of the sale price. The 
court said, by way of dictum, that the seller should 
have notified the principal when the agent's personal 
check bounced, so that the principal would have been 
warned before settlement with the agent. This case has 
no application, since in the case at bar the respondents 
did not know that their seed had been sold or of any 
other wrongdoing, and so had no knowledge of anything 
about which to complain. 
Appellant next cites ~ll orga 11 r. Georgia Paring ~· 
Coustruction Co., 149 S.E. -±~G (Ga. 1929). wherein a 
third part~-, with knowledge of the principal-agent rela-
tion~hip, chose to deal with the agent personally rather 
than in his eapacit~- as agent. It was held that. in such 
a situation, the principal cannot be held liable. It is 
difficult to see how tllis case can be applied to the 
I' ad~ ]>pforp this Court. None of the respondents ever 
thought t hPy wPn"' selling seed directl~- to ~I a lin: ~Ialin 
1P~til'i<>d that he never purchased seed in his ova1 name; 
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and appellant knew that Malin was not licensed to deal 
in his own name. 
Appellant's next citation IS the I-I arrison case 
(Utah), supra, which we have already fully discussed 
under Point No. 2 of this brief. 
Appellant then cites American Jurisprudence to the 
effect that an agent has no authority to make credit 
sales when he has been supplied with sufficient cash. 
This citation is concerned with appellant's Point No. 2 
which we have already discussed, and has no direct 
bearing on waiver or estoppei~ 
Appellant's final citation under this point is Willis-
ton on Sales} 2:312. The essence of this citation is that 
an agent, if he has been clothed with indicia of owner-
ship by the owner, may pass title even though he has 
been instructed by the owner not to sell. This rule is 
usually limited to situations where the person so clothed 
with indicia of ownership appears to the purchaser to 
~;e the owner of the goods. This rule cannot apply to 
the facts now before this Court. Appellant knew that 
Malin did not own the seed in question, and that Malin 
did not even have a license to permit him to buy or 
deal in his own name. Further, Malin was appellant's 
agent, not the agent of respondents. 
It is not easy to follow the trend of appellant's 
argument under this point because part of the authority 
cited, as theM organ case, attempts to show that respond-
ents sold their seed directly to Malin; whereas other 
authority, as the Williston citation, attempts to show 
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that respondents sold their seed directly to appellant by 
giving Malin indicia of ownership. 
2. As To Those Respondents Who Had Malin Hold 
Their Seed For Speculation 
We have already responded to this section of appel-
lant's brief in Point No. 1 of this brief, wherein we 
evaluated appellant's claim that respondents were guilty 
of collusion and conspiracy against appellant. We will 
not discuss this in greater detail, but we will set forth 
Malin's testimony as to the custom of holding seed until 
the market was more favorable. 
"Sometimes they were holding because they 
couldn't sell it (seed) at all. I mean, there are 
times in the year when you cannot sell seed except 
at a very reduced price. Now a grower gets those 
times when it is impossible for him to sell seed. 
Then, of course, it is usually when the market 
has been low, naturally the~- want to hold them 
for a higher price. They are speculating, I sup-
pose, but at times when none of the seed buying 
companies will buy seed, I don ~t know whether 
a man is holding for speculation or not." (R. 
48-49) 
Appellant was fully fanuliar with the alfalfa seed market 
and the custom of nu1ny fanners to hold their seed until 
the market price was favorable. 
Since appellant contends that Malin had no author-
ity to ~tore seed whirh had not been purchased, it might 
be helpful to point out (1) that appellant knew of the 
practice of gnnn:'rs to hold their seed during slun1ps in 
the 1narket (R . ..J-S) ~ (2) that smuetin1es a period of 
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more than eight months would pass between advance 
payments and actual purchase (Statement of Facts) ; 
and (3) that some seed, e.g., Lot No. 1722, was held 
from 1954 to 1956 before it was purchased and shipped, 
(R. 60-61). Apparently appellant would continue nego-
tiations while the seed thus remained in storage, (R. 
48, 60-61). 
Appellant also contends that respondents sought to 
deal with Malin personally, and to rely upon his personal 
credit. We fail to find anything in the record to sustain 
such a contention. Malin admitted that, though he ini-
tially issued personal checks to accommodate the 
growers, he soon was motivated to issue personal checks 
solely by his own financial convenience, (R. 21). When 
pressed for a specific recollection, Malin said that he 
did not remember any of the respondents ever asking 
him for a personal check, (R. 64). It is difficult to see 
any indication that respondents sought to rely on :Malin's 
personal credit. 
In summary of our response to appellant's argu-
ments on waiver and estoppel, we have shown (1) that 
every one of Malin's procedures in making payments 
and advances was approved by appellant; (2) that there 
is no evidence that any of these respondents ever sold 
their seed or that title passed to appellant; and ( 3) 
that respondents made reasonable inquiry as to the 
location of their seed and received various false explana-
tions from Malin. 
(d) The Trial Court Did Not Err in Holding 
Appellant Liable For Conversion Of Plain-
tiff's Money By Wayne Malin 
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Appellant's Point No. 4 questions the meaning of 
the Findings, Conclusion and Decree. Appellant first 
questions the conclusion that Malin "fraudulently con-
verted (respondents') seed and/or money," and asserts 
that if the money belonged to respondents they must 
have been paid and cannot now assert a claim against 
appellant. It is submitted that the finding is not obtuse; 
that it simply means that Malin obtained money from 
appellant which should have been delivered to respond-
ents, and then converted that money to himself. This, 
of course, presupposes that sales had been made by 
respondents. If not, Malin converted respondents seed 
and so did appellant. 
Appellant's second question is whether ~Ialin acted 
as agent of respondents in receiving money for them. 
If so, it is contended that respondents' money would 
have been converted by their own agent. rnder the facts 
of tllis case, no serious contention can be made that 
Malin acted as respondents' agent. \Ye have shown that 
~I a lin represented appellant in negotiating with the 
grower~. and, eYen when son1e growers w-ould not immed-
iate I:· sell, .Jlalin would 1nake subsequent offers for 
appellant when the 1narket would rise. 
COXCLCSIOX 
.\ ppPllant has only been held liable for the seed 
''It ielt it actually received and for which respondents 
ha vP not been fully paid. As to those respondents who 
rPI'll~<'d to sell tht'ir seed, appellant is liable as a con-
VPI'h'r. As to thost~ respondents. if any, who accepted 
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a purchase price, appellant is liable for the unpaid 
balance. It is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
of the trial court was not in error, and that the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD w. CLYDE 
RAY E. NASH 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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